Publications
De Se Names (with Maite Ezcurdia)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful.
We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful.
The Fragmentation of Felt Time
Philosophers' Imprint, Volume 22 • 2022
I propose that attentive engagement fragments felt time. This explains cases where, while absorbed in an activity that itself requires experiencing time such as listening to music, we feel as though time is flying by.
I propose that attentive engagement fragments felt time. This explains cases where, while absorbed in an activity that itself requires experiencing time such as listening to music, we feel as though time is flying by.
Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time by Carlos Montemayor
Crítica, 2018
I first argue that Montemayor’s conciliatory model of temporal experience is best understood in terms of access-consciousness. I then argue that that the views he aims to reconcile—cinematism, retentionalism, and extensionalism—are, however, concerned with phenomenal-consciousness.
I first argue that Montemayor’s conciliatory model of temporal experience is best understood in terms of access-consciousness. I then argue that that the views he aims to reconcile—cinematism, retentionalism, and extensionalism—are, however, concerned with phenomenal-consciousness.
Why Lewis’ appeal to natural properties fails to solve Kripke’s rule-following paradox
Philosophical Studies, 2015
I argue that the claim that meaning-facts are guiding is crucial to a proper formulation of Kripke’s paradox. I then use this formulation to reject Lewis’s appeal to natural properties to solve this paradox.
I argue that the claim that meaning-facts are guiding is crucial to a proper formulation of Kripke’s paradox. I then use this formulation to reject Lewis’s appeal to natural properties to solve this paradox.
A Quantum Theory of Felt Duration
Analytic Philosophy, 2014 (Winner of Marc Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind)
I propose a novel account of felt duration in terms of a subjective clock. This clock takes as basic unit or ‘tick’ what I call an experienced quantum: a short-lived chunk of a situation that is experienced as forming a temporally extended but tightly unified whole. The felt durations of long-lived events--e.g. of concerts, meetings, or dinners—are then explained in terms of experiences of the numerosity of such quanta. The felt durations of short-lived events—e.g. of short sounds or movements—are given in terms of how much of a quantum such events are experienced as taking up.
I propose a novel account of felt duration in terms of a subjective clock. This clock takes as basic unit or ‘tick’ what I call an experienced quantum: a short-lived chunk of a situation that is experienced as forming a temporally extended but tightly unified whole. The felt durations of long-lived events--e.g. of concerts, meetings, or dinners—are then explained in terms of experiences of the numerosity of such quanta. The felt durations of short-lived events—e.g. of short sounds or movements—are given in terms of how much of a quantum such events are experienced as taking up.
Comment on “Specialness and Egalitarianism”
Thought, 2013
I argue that Giovani Merlo’s use of cross-temporal grounding relations to reconcile the intuition that the present is objectively different from the past and the future with the intuition that the present is on a par with all other times leads to an implausible view.
I argue that Giovani Merlo’s use of cross-temporal grounding relations to reconcile the intuition that the present is objectively different from the past and the future with the intuition that the present is on a par with all other times leads to an implausible view.